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Creating an Online Internet Tax: A Complex
Construction?
Isaac J. Morris*
Death and taxes and childbirth! There’s never any convenient time for
any of them!
—Margaret Mitchell, Gone With the Wind (1936).1
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

While the Internet was created over thirty years ago, its development took many
different turns before reaching its present state.2 Its creators no doubt realized its novelty,
but could not predict its future.3 From email and instant messaging, to swapping music4
and streaming live video, the Internet has not only brought forth many innovations, but
has also regenerated old ideas that have opened new avenues.5 One of its greater impacts
is evident in online sales. In 1998, consumers purchased $5 billion worth of goods over

* J.D. candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, 2004. Special thanks to Professor James P.
Speta for his feedback on this paper, as well as the staff and editors of the Northwestern Journal of
Technology and Intellectual Property for their edits and revisions.
1

MARGARET MITCHELL, GONE WITH THE WIND 659 (Warner Books ed., Warner Books, Inc. 1993)
(1936).
2
LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD, 41,
122-26 (2001) (noting that the creator of the World Wide Web (“WWW”) “came up with the idea . . . after
increasing frustration over the fact that computers at [his lab] couldn’t easily talk to each other” and how
today online books, music, film and culture databases now saturate the online market.). Lessig notes that
the WWW and the Internet are in fact distinct concepts. Id. at 41, 44; see also Internet Tax Freedom Act
(“ITFA”), Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 1101(e)(3)(A), (C), 112 Stat. 2681, 2719 (1998) (defining the “WWW”
as the “means by placement of material in a computer server-based file archive so that it is publicly
accessible, over the Internet, using hypertext transfer protocol, file transfer protocol, or other similar
protocols” and delineating the “Internet” to be the collective “myriad of computer and
telecommunications facilities, including equipment and operating software, which comprise the
interconnected world-wide network of networks that employ the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet
Protocol, or any predecessor or successor protocols to such protocol, to communicate information of all
kinds by wire or radio.”) For ease of this paper, however, the term “Internet” will be used regardless of
whether it may be more appropriate to use the term “WWW.”
3
Cf. Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Innovation, 51 DUKE L.J. 1783, 1789-90 (2002). “The
innovation of the Internet—built into its architecture—is an innovation in the ways in which culture gets
made. Let the dotcom era flame out. It won’t matter to this innovation one bit.” Id. at 1790.
4
No Internet paper would be complete without some mention of diabolical genius Shawn Fanning. While
other online music services copied his idea, Napster created a paradigm shift in the way companies view
online music. For a brief background of Napster’s rise and fall, see JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT
158-62 (2001).
5
See LESSIG, supra note 2, at 169. “The [Internet] is an open architecture; it begs for people to discover
new ways to combine the resources it makes available.” Id. (emphasis added).
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the Internet;6 by 2001, purchases increased to more than $32 billion. Unfortunately,
states are not taxing Internet purchases, and as a result, they are failing to take advantage
of this rising stream of commerce. For example, “[i]n 1999 alone, states lost $525
million in foregone sales taxes due to an inability to collect these taxes on Internet
purchases.”7 These numbers increase each year, and by 2003, “states [were] predicted to
forego $20 billion due to their inability to collect [sales] taxes from out-of-state sellers
conducting business over the Internet.”8 Because states generate nearly half of their tax
revenue from sales and gross receipts taxes,9 the rising trend of online sales creates worry
about this untapped resource.10
States are not necessarily blind to these numbers however, and the majority do
require buyers to pay taxes on Internet sales,11 but “few states enforce those laws.”12
Some scholars suggest that states may not be committing a grievous error because lost
revenue is far less than actually reported.13 Other commentators note that before taxes on
Internet sales can be collected, they must deal with the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in
Quill Corporation v. North Dakota: “states can’t force a business to collect sales taxes
unless they have a store or other physical presence in the state.”14 Finally, a belief that
enforcement of these taxes will be overwhelmingly difficult seems to pervade the general
6

Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, Is More Government Regulation Needed to Promote ECommerce?, 35 CONN. L. REV. 195, 211 (2002).
7
Kathleen P. Lundy, The Taxation of E-Commerce: The Inapplicability of Physical Presence
Necessitates an Economic Presence Standard, 8 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 12, 14 (2001).
8
Megan E. Groves, Tolling the Information Superhighway: State Sales and Use Taxation of Electronic
Commerce, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 619, 619 (2000) (citing NGA Online: Overview of Sales and Use Taxes
and Electronic Commerce, at
http://www.nga.org/nga/legislativeUpdate/1,1169,C_ISSUE_BRIEF%5ED_1248,00.html (last visited Apr.
16, 2004)).
9
Groves, supra note 8, at 619 (citing NGA Online: Sources of State Tax Revenue). There seems to be
some disparity however, in the accuracy of this number. See States Ask Congress to Bless NetTax
[hereinafter Net Tax], at http://www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/internet/09/25/net.taxes/ap/index.html (last
visited Apr. 16, 2004) (“The National Governors Association estimates sales taxes make up one-third of
state tax revenue, and state and local governments fear that tax collections will decline as shoppers turn to
the Internet more often”).
10
See Ian Christopher McCaleb, States Argue forTaxing Internet Transactions, CNN.COM, March 14,
2001, at http://www.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/03/14/internet.taxes/index.html (last visited Mar. 3,
2004). “Sales taxes must be collected, some have argued, because some states do not levy income taxes on
their residents -- meaning sales taxes are a principal source of income.” Id.
11
Net Tax, supra note 9. Technically, sales taxes only occur “upon purchases . . . in the taxing state.”
Groves, supra note 8, at 622 (citing PRENTICE-HALL, INC., PRENTICE HALL’S GUIDE TO SALES AND USE
TAXES 57 (1988)). When academia and the press refer to a state requiring a buyer to pay taxes on Internet
purchases, they likely mean a use tax, which occurs “outside of the geographic boundaries of the taxing
state . . . .” Groves, supra note 8, at 622. In theory, however, the two are equivalent. See Austan Goolsbee
& Jonathan Zittrain, Evaluating the Costs and Benefits of Taxing Internet Commerce, 52 NAT’L TAX J. 413,
413 (1999) (“If a buyer in Boston . . . orders a book from Amazon.com (located in Washington state) . . .
the buyer technically owes a use tax (equivalent to the sales tax) on the purchase to Massachusetts . . . .”)
(emphasis added). A related concept is that “[i]n most events, a purchaser will be exempt from use taxes if
an applicable sales tax was paid in the state where the goods were purchased. This avoids double-taxation,
and preserves competitive equilibrium between in-state and out-of-state vendors.” Anthony C. Camilli,
Run for the Border! Evasion of Sales and Use Taxes By Mail-Order and Internet Sellers, 19 J.L. & COM.
137, 140 (1999).
12
Net Tax, supra note 9.
13
Goolsbee & Zittrain, supra note 11, at 417 (arguing that “the revenue loss in 1998 [from lost taxes on
Internet sales] . . . amounted to less than one-quarter of one percent of total state and local sales tax revenue
(or 0.05 percent of total tax revenue.”)).
14
Net Tax, supra note 9 (discussing State v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 214 (N.D. 1991))..

2

Vol. 2:2]

¶3

Isaac J. Morris

public thought.15 This paper will address each of these issues in turn to demonstrate the
manageable nature of constructing a workable system of taxing Internet sales.
Part II grapples with the idea that reports of lost revenue are widely exaggerated. It
shows how this notion misses the bigger picture, and how a conception of present data
cannot be indicative of future planning. Next, Part III scrutinizes the necessity of
imposing a physical presence requirement for Internet sales taxes. It attacks not only the
Supreme Court but also Congress for its lackadaisical approach to the subject. Finally,
Part IV provides several straightforward solutions to the problem of collecting Internet
sales taxes.
II. ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNET TAXES: COSTS V. BENEFITS

¶4

The assertion that states lose millions in uncollected Internet sales taxes receives
deference from academics and politicians, but is nonetheless a disputed position. Austan
Goolsbee and Jonathan Zittrain argue that loss in revenue to be highly inaccurate for
several reasons:
First, . . . business-to-business [sales are] largely exempt from sales
tax16 . . . Second, the predicted revenue losses ignore the possibility of
trade creation. Products that might not have been purchased in a store
were it not for the Internet, such as online greeting cards, should not be
counted for lost revenue. Third, even if we assume that electronic
commerce is entirely divisionary and that all of the commerce will be
business-to-consumer, the calculations still have serious flaws by failing to
account for the types of products being sold.17

¶5

Goolsbee and Zittrain note that “many computer sellers online already pay sales
taxes,”18 and that “Internet sales [may] cannibalize non-taxed catalog sales rather than
retail store sales.”19
15

See Taxes Slip Through the Net, THE ECONOMIST, May 31, 1997, at 22 (stating such reasons as the
reduction of “traditional intermediaries, such as bankers and brokers, who report transactions to tax
authorities,” and the prevalence of electronic money, which “can be anonymous, untraceable—and a good
deal more convenient for money launderers,” will pose thorny issues for the taxman); but see Goolsbee &
Zittrain, supra note 11, at 421 (stating that “[c]alculation of taxes . . . may be tedious, but such a task is
well-suited to an electronic environment.”)
16
The import that business-to-business markets play is staggering. “By 2002, the Internet may be used
for more than $300 billion worth of commerce between businesses.” Marcelino Ford-Livene, The Digital
Dilemma: Ten Challenges Facing Minority-Owned New Media Ventures, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 577, 602
(1999) (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THE EMERGING DIGITAL ECONOMY 7 (Apr. 1998)) (emphasis
added).
17
Goolsbee & Zittrain, supra note 11, at 415.
18
Id. at 416. One notable example of an online computer seller already collecting sales taxes is Apple
(www.apple.com). The door for tax-free Apple products remains open through other online vendors,
however, with CDW being one example (www.cdw.com). Even with this competition, apple.com
continues to receive business possibly due to exclusive academic pricing and the safety of avoiding a third
party vendor.
19
Id. at 416. Such a position may be tentative in light of many companies opening Internet-based stores.
Cf. Paul J. Gessing, PRO & CON Net Tax Should Congress Allow States to Tax Internet Sales to Narrow
the Budget Deficits? No: States’ Bold Quest for Internet Sales Tax is Power Grab After Spending Spree of
the 90s, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, June 8, 2003. Interestingly enough, “[t]he online divisions of Wal-Mart,
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The problem with attacking lost revenue, however, is that, despite possible errors in
calculating exact figures, the volume of Internet business continues to increase
exponentially. There can be little doubt that online purchasing has yet to reach its apex.
Even if sales appear to be insignificant at present, such data is not indicative of future ecommerce. Indeed, “[r]esearchers have generally found that the adoption of new
technologies is sluggish at first.”20 Robert Hahn and Anne Layne-Farrar point to the
dramatic growth of the debit card industry: “In 1988, 87% of all retail purchases were
paid in cash and only a handful of merchants . . . even accepted debit cards . . . . By late
2001, [however,] debit cards accounted for 8.3 billion transactions worth $348 billion.”21
Additional evidence shows similar trends in Internet sales.22 Hence, the revenue from ecommerce may not only increase to the level that Goolsbee and Zittrain dispute, but it
may well surpass that level in the near future.
A. The Mirage of Small Numbers

¶7

¶8

Even if current data points to smaller sums of online sales tax revenue, such
evidence does nothing to dispute the validity of the claim that significant revenue is being
lost. Goolsbee and Zittrain attempt to invalidate these calculations, stating that “[t]he
existence of untaxed catalog sales has not bankrupted state budgets and for the next
several years, online sales are likely to be considerably smaller than mail-order sales
[were] even decades ago.” 23 They then assert that the “costs of [Internet sales]
enforcement [may] . . . be better applied elsewhere in the short run.”24
While the Goolsbee-Zittrain argument highlights the uncertainty of revenue loss, it
reaches dubious conclusions by making an incorrect analogy between Internet sales taxes
and catalog sales taxes, and by disfavoring the timely implementation of an Internet sales
tax system. First, the fact that states avoid bankruptcy without collecting tax on catalog
sales misses the point entirely. To be sure, states certainly want this revenue, and in an
era of overwhelming budget deficits, states may in fact need this revenue. For example,
in 2004 California faces a massive $38 billion budget deficit.25 Even if the collection of
Internet sales tax only amounted to several million dollars now, it would still be
additional revenue. Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger ran a successful campaign built in
large part on his promise to solve the deficit problem.26 If “politics-as-usual” must lose,
there seems to be no reason not to embrace lost sources of revenue.
Target and several other major brick-and-mortar retailers have voluntarily decided to collect taxes on sales
via their Web sites.” Id.
20
Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 6, at 207.
21
Id. at 208-09.
22
Id. at 209-12; see also infra notes 109-11 and accompanying discussion.
23
Goolsbee & Zittrain, supra note 11, at 417-18.
24
Id.
25
Alorie Gilbert, California Budget Crisis to Hit IT, NEWS.COM, July 30, 2003, at
http://news.com.com/2100-1012-5058055.html (last visited March 4, 2004).
26
Cf. Arnie! Arnie!: A Comfortable Victory, But A Lot of Promises to Keep, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 11,
2003, at 29-30. The possibility exists that Governor Schwarzenegger will not enact the Internet sales tax
because it could be construed as an increase in taxes, something which Schwarzenegger promised to avoid,
even though it would only capture taxes to which California is legally entitled. Regardless of the public
perspective, such a prognosis would not necessarily undermine Governor Schwarzenegger’s prospect of a
second term in office. It should be remembered that “a former movie actor who became a Republican
governor of California also promised not to raise taxes, raised them, and went on to become president.” Id.
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States facing less severe budget shortfalls stand to gain even more from an Internet
sales tax. Current estimated budget deficits for Florida and Tennessee stand at $2 billion
and $500 million respectively.27 With a total of forty-nine states in the red,28 there is no
better time to reexamine revenue sources. Furthermore, not only will raw dollar numbers
of Internet sales increase, but the growth of the whole industry may begin to account for a
larger portion of total sales tax revenue—a point that Goolsbee and Zittrain reluctantly
acknowledge.29 Indeed, even if Internet sales are comparatively small, online sales are
still growing “much faster than total retail sales: 2001 [Internet sales] increased 19.3%
over 2000 while total retail sales only increased 3.3%,” suggesting that online purchasing
may be growing at a very high rate. 30
¶10
State budget crises become even more of a factor when considering long-term
strategies. “Thanks to weak revenues and harmful federal policies, stated budget deficits
will persist until at least fiscal 2005, when states will still face collective budgetary gaps
exceeding $40 billion for that year.”31 While cuts in spending will no doubt be used to
cure such ills, they will likely be joined with tax increases,32 and states with balanced
budget amendments will scramble to conserve their resources. The mantra that “drastic
times call for drastic measures” may not have to apply where states are willing to
implement and enforce sales taxes on e-commerce.
¶11
Finally, the argument that potential revenue collection from Internet sales taxes is
too small ignores basic economics. As long as the tax revenues from Internet sales
collected by State governments outweigh the associated costs, there will be a profit. The
only economic reason not to collect these taxes would be if the costs were prohibitive.33
Initial start-up costs, regardless of amount, would of course be borne just once. A more
relevant analysis would focus on whether actual operating costs would impose any
significant burdens on the system.34 As Richard Posner notes, “[the] government
at 30.
27
Budget Deficits, AUGUSTA CHRONICLE, June 20, 2003.
28
Currently, Wyoming is the only state with a budget surplus. See Robert W. Black, State Budget
Surplus Up by $33M, THE CASPER STAR-TRIBUNE, Jan. 14, 2003, available at
http://www.casperstartribune.net/articles/2003/01/14/news/wyoming/e30b6cf0413049c8d5a4e9f78271d354
.txt (last visited Mar. 4, 2004).
29
“If the growth rate of online retail commerce continues at 70 percent per year after 2003, by 2007 the
revenue loss would amount to as much as ten percent of total sales tax revenue . . . . It is the possibility of
these extreme losses, albeit well into the future, that makes the issue of enforcement so politically sensitive
today.” Goolsbee & Zittrain, supra note 11, at 418.
30
Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 6, at 211.
31
Matthew Vadum, State Budget Deficits Will Top $40 Billion in 2005, Analyst Says, THE BOND BUYER,
Oct. 24, 2003, at 5.
32
Of course, the implementation of an Internet sales tax would not be a panacea for state budget deficits.
See id. (stating that the Cato Institute blames “states’ current financial problems primarily on out-of-control
spending that state legislators approved in the 1990s,” while Iris J. Lave “blames the deficits largely on
‘over-exuberant’ tax-cutting by states in that decade.”) Nevertheless, by not collecting taxes from Internet
sales, states overlook a means of somewhat alleviating their budgetary woes.
33
Cf. EDWIN G. DOLAN & DAVID E. LINDSEY, ECONOMICS 605 (5th ed. 1988)
If the increase in revenue exceeds the increase in cost (that is, if marginal revenue is greater than marginal
cost), boosting output by one unit increases total profit. . . . It follows that in order to maximize profit, a
firm should expand its output as long as marginal revenue exceeds marginal cost . . . .
Id.; FREDERICK S. WEAVER, ECONOMIC LITERACY: BASIC ECONOMICS WITH AN ATTITUDE 53 (2002) (“As
long as the firm’s increased output and sales generate additional revenues (marginal revenues) greater than
the associated increased costs (marginal costs), total profits rise.”)
34
Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 339 (5th ed. 1998). “If we ask not how large a
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generally lacks the discipline of competition and the incentive of profit maximization.”35
Here, however, because states control the demand for Internet sales only indirectly
through taxes, they cannot truly affect the popularity of online purchases. Indeed, the
notion that taxes will drastically affect online spending appears to be premature at most.
A 1999 “CIO magazine study [reported] that seventy-one percent of consumers [would]
not alter their online spending if sales and use taxes [were] imposed on goods and
services purchased over the Internet.”36 States have every incentive to collect taxes and
decrease their costs associated with tax collection.37 Keeping costs low, while Internet
sales increase, will create a more profitable Internet sales tax system.
¶12
In the end, proving the economic soundness of an Internet sales tax collection
system depends on data not yet available: the estimated costs of collection. Once this
number is known, states will be free either to rely on previously reported estimates of
potential revenue collection, or to undertake more scrupulous analysis of the online
market. Until more scrutiny is given to this data, governments and academics can only
conjecture as to how much could be gained.
¶13
Opponents to online sales taxes may speculate, however, that even if states have
incentives to decrease administrative costs, there is nothing to prevent a state from
levying exorbitant sales taxes. “According to the theory of competitive federalism
[however], competition among governments will constrain governments from
overcharging or over-regulating.”38 This theory already finds strong support in land use
controls.
If a municipality uses exactions to overregulate or overcharge, the
developer will take, or threaten to take, its capital elsewhere: from the
overreaching community to another community, from the residential
market most often affected by exactions to the commercial market, or
from the building market to other forms of investment.39

new entrant’s start-up costs would be but how large the ratio of start-up to operating costs—in other words,
of fixed to variable costs—would be then we shall identify a real problem of entry.” Id.
35
Id. at 509.
36
Groves, supra note 8, at 620.
37
The analogy to perfect competition, though not quite “perfect,” does provide a useful comparison. “[A]
perfectly competitive market is composed of a large number of firms that are so small relative to the size of
their market that they cannot influence price.” WEAVER, supra note 33 at 53-54. Such firms “are price
takers . . . [because] the price at which each firm sells its output is determined by forces beyond the firm’s
control; the price is set by supply and demand conditions in the market as a whole.” DOLAN & LINDSEY,
supra note 33, at 603. The fact that prices are set, however, does not mean that businesses cannot increase
profits. Decreasing costs, even with static prices, will enlarge the bottom line. (For purposes of this
footnote, and in order to avoid an in-depth discussion of microeconomics, this example assumes that a
company decreasing costs would not also decrease price and destroy the state of perfect competition). The
government faces a similar situation. While it is not in competition with other entities for tax collection,
the taxing effect is small enough that there is substantial difficulty in influencing price. See supra note 36
and accompanying discussion. The amount of output, or Internet sales, is determined by forces beyond the
government’s control and there is every incentive to decrease costs.
38
Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 506 (1991).
39
Id. at 511.
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The same idea holds true with online sales taxes. State and local governments face
competition from neighboring jurisdictions. To prevent people from voting with their
feet, states have strong incentives to balance tax rates with revenue collection.
¶15
Finally, if costs do end up negating revenues, states should nevertheless strongly
consider the implementation of Internet sales tax systems.
B. No Time Like the Present
¶16

Any lost revenue from untaxed catalog sales proves why a system of taxing Internet
sales must be implemented sooner than later. When taxes are not immediately collected,
the perception is created of a tax-free avenue. This becomes the norm for both the tax
payor as well as the tax collector. As Goolsbee and Zittrain state, “[w]hen Internet sales
account for, say 10 or 20% of total retail sales, [some people] believe it may be difficult
to put the genie back in the bottle.”40 So while it may be true that Internet sales account
for a small portion of sales overall that further validates the idea that the sooner the
Internet sales tax becomes a reality, the more willing businesses will be to accept it.41
¶17
Goolsbee and Zittrain counter this argument by suggesting that numbers may not
justify such a decision, and that for now, such worries are unwarranted.42 Still, the
logical rebuttal is that sooner is better than later. Twelve years ago, “[e]stimates of lost
revenues attributable to the inability of states to enforce use tax collection duties [on
mail-order sales] range[d] from $694 million to $3 billion per year.”43 As these numbers
multiply, it will become increasingly more difficult to implement a sales tax system; the
logistics of putting such a system into operation is far easier when a smaller market is
affected.
C. The Proper Target
¶18

Voluntary tax payments by individuals are inadequate as compared to the revenue
lost not—or by belatedly—taxing e-commerce. Unsurprisingly, “[c]onsumers do not
generally understand that they have an obligation to pay use taxes.”44 The taxing
authorities of a State are then left standing in an unenviable position: in order to collect
these revenues, they will have to increase expenditures to conduct individual audits.45

40
41

Goolsbee & Zittrain, supra note 11, at 418.
Timothy Fallaw, Note, The Internet Tax Freedom Act: Necessary Protection or Deferral of the
Problem?, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 161, 186 (1999) (noting that “[a] possibility exists that after three years of
tax freedom [under the IFTA], taking [the] benefit away from the unwilling industry will be difficult” and
that the “long period of immunity from taxation will likely lead to an ardent effort on the part of the
Internet industry to make the moratorium permanent.”).
42
“The data suggest . . . that for the next several years . . . there is little revenue to be gained from
enforcing taxes on Internet sales.” Goolsbee & Zittrain, supra note 11, at 418.
43
Timothy H. Gillis, Note, Collecting the Use Tax on Mail-Order Sales, 79 GEO. L.J. 535, 538 (1991).
44
Val John Christensen, Leveling the Playing Field: A Business Perspective on Taxing E-Commerce,
2000 BYU L. REV. 139, 143 (2000). Mr. Christensen makes the bold statement that “[consumers] see sales
taxes as a legitimately avoidable part of the purchase price.” Id. (emphasis added). But see Camilli, supra
note 11, at 162-63 (asserting that it is patently speculative whether “imposing tax collection duties on outof-state vendors . . . would hurt sales,” and backing that statement with “a Gallup survey [which] found that
seventy-eight percent of all mail-order customers view sales tax as totally irrelevant.”) .
45
Camilli, supra note 11, at 147-48.
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The prohibitive costs of such audits, coupled with the predictably miniscule rewards, lead
most jurisdictions to scrap such ideas.46
¶19
Decreasing enforcement expenditure is not the only economic reason states would
benefit from collecting Internet sales taxes directly from online companies. If businesses
and governments are truly concerned with efficiency, then the vendor becomes the
logical choice for both the collector and dispatcher of sales taxes. Cost-internalization
theory supports this argument. Harold Demsetz, who developed the cost-internalization
theory for property rights,47 “hypothesized that [such] rights emerge when some change
in the relative value of resources occurs that makes it cost-effective to internalize costs
that previously were experienced as externalities.”48 In other words, “[t]he Demsetz
thesis can be seen as an anticipation of the idea that the common law evolves toward
efficient rules.”49 Having a truly efficient system, or at the very least trying to
approximate such a system, requires that cost-internalization be borne by the party most
able to bear that cost.50 Otherwise, avoidable inefficiencies are created and extra costs
are added to the system. While there seems to be little dispute that states may force
consumers to pay use taxes on out-of-state purchases, this creates inefficiencies. The cost
of enforcement against consumers outweighs the cost of enforcement against online
business. Moreover, penalties and fees charged to companies for noncompliance of sales
tax remittance would create a stronger shift in the business community than in the general
population.51 The logical conclusion therefore, is to transfer the costs from the state and
consumer to the business.
III. THE UBIQUITOUS PRESENCE OF THE INTERNET
¶20

The idea that most states may enact laws requiring Internet purchasers to pay use
taxes seems inconsistent with the fact that most states cannot require an online company
to collect sales taxes. Why go after thousands of individuals when focusing on several
large businesses would produce the same result? Both the Supreme Court and Congress
conveyed garbled answers on why such taxes are not possible, and neither branch shows
any sign of revising their decisions.

46

E.g., Megan E. Groves, Note, Where There’s a Will, There’s a Way: State Sales and Use Taxation of
Electronic Commerce, 74 IND. L.J. 293, 310 (1998) (“States generally do not attempt to catch purchasers
who fail to report use tax liabilities.”).
47
Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967).
48
Thomas W. Merrill, Introduction: The Demsetz Thesis and the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. 331, 332 (2002).
49
Id. at 331. The transfer of Demsetz’s theory from merely exclusion relating to property rights to other
legal topics receives support from many academics, though it is debatable whether the argument should be
taken that far. See id. at 333-34.
[If Demsetz’s theory applies] to any institution that functions to internalize externalities, which would
cover many forms of state ownership, government regulation, and private contracting as well as
conventional property, . . . then the thesis would be tantamount to saying that virtually all law tends to
evolve in the direction of promoting efficiency—a kind of public-interest theory of regulation.
Id. at 333 (emphasis added).
50
“[T]he incentives of private individuals are socially efficient when costs and benefits are fully
internalized, whereas incentives are inefficient when some costs and benefits are externalized.” Robert
Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CAL. L.R. 1, 3 (1985).
51
Supra text accompanying notes 46-47.
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¶21

Approximately ten years ago, the Supreme Court quashed the logical approach to
state sales taxes of Internet purchases in Quill Corporation v. North Dakota.52 The facts
appear quite simple. North Dakota wanted to collect sales taxes from Quill, a mail-order
office supplies company, whose sales to approximately 3,000 North Dakota customers
totaled $1 million.53 However, Quill retained no “physical presence” in North Dakota.54
On this basis, the majority opinion55 denied North Dakota the power to collect taxes from
out-of-state vendors.56
¶22
The majority opinion relied on precarious precedent and outdated logic to support
its position. It began by stating that review of “state taxing statutes to out-of-state
sellers” requires an examination of the statute under both the Due Process Clause as well
as the Commerce Clause.57 The opinion referred to classic notions of “fair play and
substantial justice,” reaffirming that a corporation may become subject to a state’s
jurisdiction without ever having a physical presence in that state.58 Over the years, the
Court has often rejected formalistic tests, and focused instead on flexible inquiries, which
allow courts to consider the facets of particular cases. This flexibility allowed familiar
analysis of due process and jurisdiction to be applied directly to Internet Sales. Justice
Stevens emphasized the importance of flexible standards: “In ‘modern commercial life’ it
matters little that such solicitation is accomplished by a deluge of catalogs rather than a
phalanx of drummers: The requirements of due process are met irrespective of a
corporation’s lack of physical presence in the taxing State.”59
¶23
Even though Quill’s contact with North Dakota residents was “more than sufficient
for due process purposes,”60 the same level of activity failed to meet the majority’s
requirements under the Commerce Clause.61 The Court noted that while “[d]ue process
centrally concerns the fundamental fairness of governmental activity, . . . the Commerce
Clause and its nexus requirement are informed not so much by concerns about fairness
for the individual defendant as by structural concerns about the effects of state regulation
on the national economy.”62 Worries arose over the dormant commerce clause and
whether states taxing e-commerce would unduly burden national commerce.63
52
53
54

Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
Id. at 302.
Id. at 302, 306. While the Court provided no exact definition of “physical presence,” it gave simplistic
examples such as “the presence of sales personnel in the State[,] . . . the maintenance of local retail stores in
the State . . . [or] all of the seller’s in-state solicitation . . . performed by independent contractors.” Id. at
306.
55
Justice Stevens authored the majority opinion. With respect to Parts I, II and III, the decision was
unanimous. Justice White dissented from Part IV, and Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Kennedy and
Thomas, concurred in the judgment of Part IV. Id. at 319-20, 321-22.
56
Id. at 321-22 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
57
Id. at 305.
58
Id. at 306-09.
59
Id. at 308.
60
Id. at 308 (emphasis added).
61
Id. at 312-13.
62
Id. at 312.
63
Lundy, supra note 7, ¶ 17 (“While the Due Process Clause is concerned with the government treating
persons fairly, the dormant Commerce Clause instead focuses on whether a state regulation places an undue
burden upon interstate commerce.”).
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¶24

The difficulty of the majority’s reliance upon the dormant commerce clause came
from its inability to recognize its anachronism. In a review of U.S. Supreme Court
Commerce Clause decisions, the North Dakota Supreme Court “concluded that those
rulings signaled a retreat from the formalistic constrictions of a stringent physical
presence test in favor of a more flexible substantive approach.”64 Bewilderingly, the U.S.
Supreme Court’s majority explicitly agreed, yet continued to impose a bright-line test of
physical location. Even though the Court touted its due process analysis, it refused to
fully acknowledge its outdated approach to the Commerce Clause, stating that stare
decisis bound it to follow National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of
Illinois,65 and to mandate a physical presence requirement for Commerce Clause
scrutiny.66 However, the Court noted “contemporary Commerce Clause jurisprudence
might not dictate the same result were the issue to arise for the first time today.”67
¶25
Both Justice White in his dissent and North Dakota took issue with the majority’s
interpretation of Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady. 68 The former argued that under
its holding, current Commerce Clause jurisprudence disaffirmed the physical presence
requirement,69 and overruled any “sort of physical-presence nexus suggested in Bellas
Hess.”70 Moreover, Justice White berated the majority for its specious reasoning:71
“Perhaps long ago a seller’s ‘physical presence’ was a sufficient part of a trade to
condition imposition of a tax on such presence. But in today’s economy, physical
presence frequently has very little to do with a transaction a State might seek to tax.”72
Why the majority turned a blind eye to such a conclusion is puzzling; it was more than
willing to recognize the anachronism of requiring a physical presence under the Due
Process Clause. The confusion increases in light of the Court’s own conflicting
precedent.
64
65
66

Quill, 504 U.S. at 314 (quoting State v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 214 (N.D. 1991)).
386 U.S. 753 (1967).
Cf. Lundy, supra note 7, ¶ 16 (noting that, by abandoning a rigid physical presence requirement, it is
not due process that poses a “significant obstacle to states implementing collection duties upon out-of state
Internet vendors, [but rather] [t]he Commerce Clause remains the primary hurdle for such state interests”).
67
Quill, 504 U.S. at 311. But cf. id. at 320 (where Justice Scalia capitulates to precedent, stating that
“[w]e have long recognized that the doctrine of stare decisis has ‘special force’ where ‘Congress remains
free to alter what we have done’ . . . [m]orever, the demands of the doctrine are ‘at their acme . . . where
reliance interests are involved’”) (emphasis added) (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S.
164, 172-73 (1989), and Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991)).
68
While Justice White concurred in Parts I, II and III of the decision, he dissented with respect to Part IV,
rejecting the notion that the Commerce Clause mandated a physical presence requirement. Id. at 321-22.
69
Id. at 303-04, 323.
70
Id. at 304. Justice White takes issue with other interpretations of precedent as well. See id. at 323-24
(noting that National Geographic Society v. California Board of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551 (1977), did not
reaffirm the continuing validity of Bellas Hess, but instead held that the “requisite nexus for requiring an
out-of-state seller . . . to collect and pay the use tax is . . . simply whether the facts demonstrate ‘some
definite link, some minimum connection, between (the State and) the person . . . it seeks to tax’”)
(alteration in original). Apparently, other countries have shared Justice White’s bewilderment over the
physical presence requirement. See Taxes slip through the Net, supra note 15 (“Under a quirk of American
law, mail-order firms are usually exempt from state sales taxes if the buyer is in a different state.”).
71
Perhaps the majority should have followed the approach of Justice Scalia, who argued “that the . . .
holding of Bellas Hess should not be overruled,” but followed “on the basis of stare decisis.” Quill 504
U.S. at 320 (Scalia, Kennedy & Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). While the
outcome would have been just as illogical, it would have given Justice White less ammunition for his
attack.
72
Id. at 327-28.
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It is a truism that the mere act of carrying on business in interstate
commerce does not exempt a corporation from state taxation. “It was not
the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate
commerce from their just share of state tax burden even though it
increases the cost of doing business.”73
¶26

By requiring a physical presence standard, the court exempts corporations from
state taxation and relieves them of this justifiable burden.74
B. Current Quill Analysis

¶27

Applying the Quill analysis today presents the same difficulties as when the ruling
was originally announced. States must satisfy the two-pronged requirement of due
process and commerce clause jurisprudence.75 Fortunately, the Internet does not require
any new law; the lower courts have long built up a consistent body of precedent.76
¶28
Zippo Manufacturing Company v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc. is the definitive analysis of
online commerce that rises to the requisite level for personal jurisdiction.77 The Zippo
Manufacturing Corporation, “well known [for its] ‘Zippo’ tobacco lighters,”78 brought
suit for trademark infringement due to the defendant’s use of the word “Zippo” in its
websites.79 The defendant replied in part by moving to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction.80
¶29
After a review of constitutional limitations, the opinion noted that “the law
concerning the permissible scope of personal jurisdiction based on Internet use is in its
infant stages. The cases are scant.” Judge McLaughlin moved forward nonetheless, and
promulgated a sliding scale approach to Internet jurisdiction as follows:
At one end the spectrum are situations where a defendant clearly does
business over the Internet. . . . At the opposite end are situations where a
73

Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 288 (quoting Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421
U.S. 100, 108 (1975)).
74
If Justice Scalia really respects stare decisis, this truism from Western Livestock must also be respected.
A counter argument may be that consumers are already required to pay and submit use taxes to the state.
But this argument lacks substance because requiring a business to pay the tax produces the same results and
generates more efficient outcomes. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying discussion.
75
Whether or not the test truly has two prongs is open to some debate. The Supreme Court itself
acknowledges this ambiguity. See Quill 504 U.S. at 313 n.7 (“We have sometimes stated that the
‘Complete Auto test, while responsive to Commerce Clause dictates, encompasses as well . . . due process
requirement[s],’” and that “such comments might suggest that every tax that passes contemporary
Commerce Clause analysis is also valid under the Due Process Clause” (alteration in original) (citations
omitted)).
76
For whatever reason, this precedent is apparently not supported by the United States Supreme Court.
See Note, A “Category-Specific” Legislative Approach to the Internet Personal Jurisdiction Problem in
U.S. Law, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1617, 1635 (2004) (asserting that “there will be no uniform, national test for
websites until the U.S. Supreme Court adopts one”). As can be seen from the discussion, the lower courts
seem to be handling the situation without too many problems, so perhaps the Court’s explicit approval is
just not necessary.
77
952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). Although only a district court case, the legal logic and
construction of the opinion has been widely cited. See infra note 86.
78
Zippo, 952 F.Supp. at 1121.
79
Id.
80
Id.
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defendant has simply posted information on an Internet Web site which is
accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions. . . . The middle ground is
occupied by interactive Web sites where a user can exchange information
with the host computer.81
¶30

Furthermore, Zippo states that personal jurisdiction under the first two situations is
straightforward, with the first allowing jurisdiction and the second denying it.82 The
court then determines jurisdiction in the “middle ground” by “examining the level of
interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the
Web site.”83 The opinion’s attempt to adhere to the Due Processs Clause is strengthened
by its reliance on World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz.84
¶31
The effects of the Zippo analysis have been felt in the majority of jurisdictions
across the country because the Internet did not require a distinct form of jurisdiction. 85
“Courts have [already] applied existing laws to the world of Cyberspace in numerous
non-tax contexts, including personal jurisdiction, criminal law, and intellectual
property.”86 Such an approach to jurisdiction and Internet sales tax laws is only logical in
order to “negate any tax neutrality between traditional, mail-order, and Internet
purchases.”87 Notwithstanding the questionable physical presence of online businesses,
lower courts have “legally controlled” the Internet—without stymieing its progression—
by not mandating a bright-line test.
¶32
Despite the rational approach of Zippo, the Supreme Court continues to emphasize
physical presence. This ignores the many “technological advances that may render such
adherence inappropriate.”88 The combination of tax neutrality, sophisticated software,
lost revenue, economic efficiency, and the existence of Internet sales tax systems already
in place by particular companies89 shows how antiquated Quill has become.90
81

Id. at 1124. Contra Millennium Enterprises, Inc. v. Millennium Music, LP, 33 F. Supp. 2d 907 (D. Or.
1999) (denying general jurisdiction where the online purchase consisted of a single CD).
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 1126-27. In doing so, Zippo establishes a framework that comports with traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); see generally
Stewart v. Hennessey, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1198 (D. Utah 2002) (applying and examining Zippo through the
lens of Supreme Court jurisprudence and finding its model to fit accepted policy).
85
See e.g., Gator.Com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2003); Carefirst Of Md., Inc. v.
Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390 (4th Cir. 2003); Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318
F.3d 446 (3d Cir. 2003); Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2002); Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen
Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883 (6th Cir. 2002); Soma Med. Int’l v. Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d
1292, 1296 (10th Cir. 1999); InfoSys Inc. v. Billingnetwork.com, Inc., No. 03 C 3047, 2003 WL 22012687
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2003); Swarovski Optik N. Am. Ltd. v. Euro Optics, Inc., C.A. No. 03-090ML, 2003
WL 22014581 (D.R.I. Aug. 25, 2003); Hartoy Inc. v. Thompson, No. 02-80454-CIV, 2003 WL 21468079
(S.D. Fla. Jan. 29, 2003); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp 44 (D.D.C. 1998); Smith v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1356 (W.D. Ark. 1997).
86
Lundy, supra note 7, at ¶ 27 (“Jack Goldsmith, a professor at the University of Chicago Law School
and scholar in the field of cyberlaw, believes existing laws can be successfully applied to Cyberspace,
although they may require some tweaking and slight adaptations”).
87
Id. See also infra note 114 and accompanying discussion.
88
Lundy, supra note 7, at ¶ 30.
89
See infra notes 100-05 and accompanying discussion.
90
Kathleen Lundy also notes that “the promise of states’ simplifying their tax laws ensures that state laws
requiring businesses to collect sales and use taxes will not unduly burden interstate commerce.” Lundy,
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Furthermore, the Court’s assertion that Congress is free to change the system ignores the
responsibility of the Court to attempt to resolve legal inconsistencies.91
C. Congress and the Ostrich Theory
¶33

While Supreme Court rulings effectively bind the hands of more progressive lower
courts, Congress—though aware and empowered to act—continues to don blinders, as
evidenced by its renewal of the Internet Tax Freedom Act (IFTA).92 Passed under
President Clinton in 1998, this legislation aimed to “develop. . .a system which [would]
accommodate the state and local needs for revenue without placing an undue burden on
the development of the Internet as a major channel of international commerce.”93
¶34
The IFTA’s implementation occurred due to “federal concerns of multiple state and
local taxation killing the Internet before it [had] a chance to firmly establish itself.”94 The
necessity of such protection, however, is debatable. “[T]he Internet . . . has grown
enormously in recent years with minimal government regulation.”95 The market itself
may have provided even better growth than the government.96 This protectionist
argument erodes further when the noted exemptions are considered. The IFTA’s
grandfather clause allowed the District of Columbia, Colorado, Connecticut, Iowa, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and
Wisconsin to continue their taxation of Internet access services,97 based on estimated
revenue losses of “approximately $50 million.”98 Whatever its intent, this exception
failed to harm either Internet use generally or e-commerce in particular. This calls into
question the necessity of the IFTA, suggesting that the Act is more paternalistic than
reasonable. While it may be true that only twelve states receive the exemption, “the
twelve jurisdictions in this group comprise twenty percent of the United States’ national
economy [!]”99
¶35
Hence, the intent of Congress backfired. Instead of providing solutions, “[IFTA]
merely exacerbate[d] the current situation by attempting to defer consideration of the
problem to a later date. Without this protection, Internet corporations and state
supra note 7, at ¶ 33.
91
Infra note 99 and accompanying discussion.
92
“On November 15, 2001, the Senate passed the Internet Tax Nondiscrimination Act that extends the
moratorium on Internet access taxes, and multiple discriminatory taxes on Internet commerce, for two
years,” and “…noticeably excludes discussion of remote sellers collecting sales taxes on Internet purchases
. . . .” Lundy, supra note 7 at 44. Due to the silence on the matter of online sales taxes, the new Act is no
more helpful than the old. If the purpose of these Acts is not to stop states from collecting Internet sales
taxes, another statute needs to be enacted allowing states that action. See infra note 118 and accompanying
discussion.
93
Fallaw, supra note 41, at 161.
94
Id. at 163.
95
Richard E Wiley, Communications Law Overview: Recent Developments in Convergence, Competition
and Consolidation, 597 PLI/PAT 395, 420 (2000).
96
Cf. James B. Speta, Book Review, A Vision of Internet Openness by Government Fiat, 96 NW. U. L.
REV. 1553, 1555 (2001) (noting that overall, markets encourage innovation better than the government).
97
Fallaw, supra note 41, at 169; see also Camilli, supra note 11, at 156
…[T]he IFTA contains an exemption for states that already taxed Internet access and either (1) an Internet
access provider had reason to know that the existing tax statute was interpreted so as to include Internet
access; or (2) the state or locality generally collected such tax on charges for Internet access.
98
Fallaw, supra note 41, at 169.
99
Id. (emphasis added).
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governments would both have [had] a sense of urgency in coming together to hammer out
a deal.”100
¶36
Congress must be proactive in overruling the Supreme Court, a point which Justice
Stevens’ opinion made explicit. “No matter how we evaluate the burdens that use taxes
impose on interstate commerce, Congress remains free to disagree with our
conclusions . . . [and] decide . . . to what extent the States may burden interstate mailorder concerns with a duty to collect use taxes.”101 At least Congress seems to be in
favor of not prohibiting states from collecting such revenue. In the recent debate on
whether to turn the “temporary moratorium on taxes on Internet access into a permanent
ban . . . [t]he only thing that both [Democrats and Republicans] agree on . . . is that the
bill has nothing to do with banning taxes on online purchases.”102 The recognition by
Congress of access taxes and its refusal to consider sales taxes illustrates its ineffective
attempt to improve the situation. In fact, the proposed bill tries to take away the right of
the “exempted states” to continue taxing Internet access.103
¶37
Congress needs to recognize the importance of creating an Internet sales tax system
States simply want the opportunity to put such a system into place. The sooner they are
given the opportunity, the sooner states and the business community can work together
on its implementation.
IV. MISCONCEIVED DIFFICULTIES
¶38

Adversaries who peddle the idea that Internet sales taxes will unduly burden online
transactions are either guilty of willful ignorance, or do not grasp the simplicity of the
solution. Internet companies are not starting with a tabula rasa when it comes to paying
state taxes. In fact, “it goes without mentioning that online retailers pay a myriad of other
taxes to the states each day—including major levies on property, payroll and income.”104
¶39
Moreover, while existing systems, like cooperative agreements, may appear to be
less burdensome to online transactions, they create an unnecessary third party in sales tax
collection. They further lose their appeal when all fifty states become involved. Clearly,
a system of Internet sales taxes is the better solution. While this does not mean such a
collection system is effortless, it does help to re-focus the inquiry. When talking of
difficulties, valid analysis begins by examining past practices for comparison as well as
what may already be taking place.
A. Current Problems
¶40

A look at some attempted solutions demonstrates their ineffectiveness and why a
state-based system of online sales tax collection would be beneficial. First, having
100
101
102
103

Id. at 189.
Quill, 504 U.S. 318.
John Schwartz, Senate Debate Due on Internet Tax Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2003.
Schwartz, supra note 102. The movement to permanently ban Internet access later imploded due to
the ambiguous definition of “Internet access.” However, “[t]he proponents of the permanent ban offered a
compromise—a temporary extension of the ban for about 5 years, as long as the new bill treats all Internet
technologies equally.” Associated Press, Internet Tax Ban Stalls Dead in Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7,
2003. What remains unclear from this compromise is whether the exempted states would continue to
receive the benefit of the grandfather clause.
104
Gessing, supra note 19.
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consumers collect use taxes through individual audits is simply not cost feasible.105
Second, other state-driven systems—such as cooperative agreements between states—are
often ineffective. Cooperative agreements operate by “each state [agreeing] that if an
out-of-state buyer makes a purchase from a vendor within their state, the vendor will
collect and remit the applicable use-tax to the state where the buyer has the purchase
delivered.”106 Camilli insists that the ineffectiveness of cooperative agreements arises
due to the ability of the buyer to have the purchase delivered to a friend outside the
jurisdiction of the cooperative agreement, who would then give the goods to the buyer.107
¶41
Unfortunately, Camilli’s argument overlooks the central flaw of cooperative
systems: the onus placed on the states.108 States are now required to transfer tax
information to each other instead of businesses. This may not seem onerous when only
two or three states institute a program, but for a cooperative agreement to be completely
effective, more and more states will have to implement similar programs. In the end, if a
state wishes to realize all of the revenue that could be collected through an Internet sales
tax system, it would have to engage in cooperative agreements with forty-nine separate
states.
¶42
This is a ludicrous solution, as the same results could be achieved by having the
businesses collect and submit the tax directly to the state. Several companies already
accomplish this task. For example, Wal-Mart “argues sales taxes are not that difficult to
collect; they are not the monster that some people think they are; and all Internet
businesses should be taxed equally.”109 Office-supply company Franklin Covey also
voluntarily complies, “filing returns in every state that has a sales tax and a use tax.”110
Even if companies object to having to comply with fifty separate state tax regimes, not to
mention thousands more at the local levels,111 this is an argument more for uniformity
rather than against viability.112
105
106
107
108

See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying discussion.
Camilli, supra note 11 at 148.
Id.
Not only does Camilli fail to attack cooperative agreements at their weakest point, but his own
conclusion leaves something to be desired. Having a purchase delivered to a friend seems like an
extraneous step most reasonable people would want to avoid unless the purchase, and the subsequent sales
tax, was for a substantial amount. This is not to say that such a situation would never be advantageous.
For instance, if the buyer lived in Tinley Park, Illinois and the friend lived in Gary, Indiana, or if a group of
friends lived in “four corners” (Utah, Colorado, Arizona and New Mexico respectively), it would be
possible to avoid or lower sales taxes by sending the purchased item “through” state lines. Of course, the
buyer then assumes a higher risk of never receiving the purchase.
109
Val John Christensen, Leveling the Playing Field: A Business Perspective on Taxing E-Commerce,
2000 BYU L. REV. 139, 141 (2000).
110
Id. Franklin Covey does so somewhat reluctantly, however, noting that it must “generate over threeand-a-half million dollars in sales revenue in 1999 just to finance the cost of its sales tax compliance
activities.” Id. Such resentment stems from the fact that there is little to no similarity among different
states’ use tax procedures, which increases costs tremendously. See id. at 153 (“We would love to see
simplification. We would love to see one rate per state . . . . We would like to see in this whole process the
balance of sovereignty of states and the push for a uniform simplified taxing mechanism.”).
111
“In the United States alone, there are nearly 30,000 state and local taxing jurisdictions, each with a
viable claim to a slice of the Internet pie.” Fallaw, supra note 93, at 163.
112
The subject of uniformity is beyond the scope of this paper, but has been discussed as a possible
solution to the burdens of sales tax collection. See Aaron G. Murphy, Comment, Will Surfing the Web
Subject One to Transient Tax Jurisdiction? Why We Need a Uniform Federal Sales Tax on Internet
Commerce, 22 SEATTLE UNIV. L.R. 1187 (1999).
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¶43

The standardization argument, “[that] lack of uniformity among the numerous state
and local taxing jurisdictions . . . [imposes] a potentially enormous burden on interstate
commerce,” obscures the real issue.113 Homogeneity is simply an implementation
argument and does not affect the validity of the basic idea.114 Businesses owe taxes.
That principle “indicates a belief that goods or services provided by means of electronic
commerce should not be taxed any differently than goods or services procured through
more conventional forms of commerce.”115 Giving one sector of the economy special
privileges, while subjecting traditional brick-and-mortar operations to the complexities of
the taxing system, violates the basic tenet of tax neutrality. When tax neutrality occurs,
tax rules do not affect the purchasing habits of individuals or the retail strategies of
business.116 Regardless of whether consumers choose to purchase items over the Internet
for other reasons, the federal government should allow the states to claim rightful
revenues.
¶44
Finally, the politically motivated accusations which allege that taxing Internet sales
leads to harassment, undue burdens, and failed companies just misdirect the issue.117 The
controversy is revenue to which the states already have legal entitlement; again, the
question is not one of validity, but one of procedure. Internet sales systems already
collect the pertinent information required for sales taxes; companies require information
such as name, location, telephone number, etc., because it assures payment from the
consumer. Placing the responsibility on the consumer to pay these taxes resigns the
government to negative revenue by requiring audit procedures whose costs outweigh the
revenue benefits. Therefore, the economically sound procedure is to have businesses
collect Internet sales taxes.
B. The Statute: Short and Sweet
¶45

Congress need not worry about struggling to create a statute giving states the power
to collect online sales taxes. The Supreme Court practically gave step-by-step
113
114

Fallaw, supra note 42, at 165.
While solutions to implementation are beyond the scope of this paper, the idea of a “State Tax
Information Clearinghouse” (STIC) provides one possible solution. See Camilli, supra note 11, at 160-62
(noting that “[a] STIC is appealing because it only requires vendors to report their information, which
minimizes the administrative hassle of tracking thousands of tax rates”).
115
Id. at 164-65. See also Lundy, supra note 7, at 38 (“The states’ difficulty in imposing tax collection
duties upon out-of-state vendors is a major obstacle to creating tax neutrality.”) Cf. SANFORD M. GUERIN
& PHILLIP F. POSTLEWAITE, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS IN FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 8 (5th ed. 1998)
(“In the past, tax policy theorists have concentrated primarily on whether the federal income tax is
equitable: Does the income tax treat taxpayers with equal incomes similarly . . . and does it differentiate
appropriately among taxpayers with unequal incomes . . . ?”) (emphasis added).
116
Kashi M. Way, Note, State and Local Sales Tax on Internet Commerce: Developing a Neutral and
Efficient Framework, 19 VA. TAX REV. 115, 126 (1999).
117
Senator Leahy of Vermont points to the fact that thousands of multiple jurisdictions around the
country could crush electronic commerce. “For example, the Vermont Teddy Bear Company . . . sells 60
percent of its bears online during its two busiest times of the year—Valentine’s Day and Mother’s Day. . . .
How could anyone vote against bears as cute and cuddly as these?” Remarks of Senator Patrick Leahy On
The Internet Tax Non-Discrimination Act of 2003, November 5, 2003, at
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200311/110503.html (last visited March 11, 2004). Senator Leahy’s
comments illustrate a myopic view: no mention is made of the online companies that already comply with
the taxing of multiple jurisdictions or the idea that the solution lies in conformity and reduced complexity
between jurisdictions rather than a free ride for electronic commerce.
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instructions on how to construct such legislation, and academic literature has already
produced one such solution.
In the levying sales and use taxes, an entity, whether a person or business,
must purposefully direct his/her activities within the taxing state and must
avail him/herself of the benefits of the jurisdiction. These benefits include
the provision of a market in which to conduct business, of police services,
and of a tribunal in which to have the ability to state his/her claims. This
Act shall hereby repudiate any requirement of physical presence within the
taxing state.118
¶46

Such a statute wisely overturns Quill’s physical presence requirement. In doing so,
it brings Due Process analysis into harmony with Commerce Clause jurisprudence, leaves
decision-making authority with the states, and falls in line with Zippo. Jurisdiction would
be available to a state, regardless of the online business’s physical and shipping locations,
as long as the website was interactive.119 This would allow states to decide whether to
tax Internet sales and allow Internet businesses to be involved in developing
implementation systems.
C. A Plastic Passion

¶47

The United States is a nation of credit cards. Statistics illustrate that “at the end of
2001, Americans had more than 1 trillion credit-card accounts (more than three accounts
for every man, woman, and child in the country), on which they were charging more than
$1.2 trillion worth of purchases a year.”120 Credit card usage has engulfed the Internet as
well. “The Pew survey, conducted in 2000, found that 48% of Internet users have bought
something online with a credit card.”121 As “[o]nline transactions have grown
substantially over the past few years, with 4.9 million credit card transactions in 1997, 9.3
million in 1998, and 19.2 million through the third quarter of 1999.”122
¶48
Credit card data provides a solution for companies wanting to know what sales tax
rate to apply to a consumer’s purchase. By using the data such a payment system
provides, i.e., the customer’s billing address, companies will be able to garner more than
enough information to apply local sales tax rates. Though not all-encompassing, this
solution indicates a promising beginning.

118

Groves, supra note 46, at 312; Groves, supra note 8, at 633-34 (“To accept the challenge by the
Supreme Court to establish a more practical standard by which courts may exercise Commerce Clause
scrutiny, Congress need only enact a law resembling the following . . .”).
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Supra notes 80-82 and accompanying discussion. If instead, the website merely provided information
and a telephone number with which to call and place an order, jurisdiction would be denied. Id. This idea
is rather important in that it harmonizes Quill and Zippo and does not require the Supreme Court to resolve
a perceived conflict.
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LYNN M. LOPUCKI ET AL., COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 403 (2d ed. 2003).
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Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 6, at 210.
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Id. at 209-10.
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D. Wherever You Go, There You Are
¶49

Of course, not all consumers choose to use plastic when making online purchases.
“[A]s other forms of ‘electronic cash’ develop, the purchaser’s residence may become
more difficult to trace.”123 Although this may appear to cause a problem, solutions are
available without the information provided by credit card companies. Apple, for
instance, provides the following explanation on its website:
Apple Store purchases will include sales tax based on the ship-to location
and the sales tax rate in effect at the time of shipping. . . . If the sales tax
rate for the state to which your order is being shipped changes before the
product is shipped, the new tax rate in effect at the time of shipment will
apply.124

¶50

Further proof that Apple does not need credit card data is illustrated by the fact that
payment methods include cashier’s checks, money orders, and wire transfers, as well as
ever-popular credit cards.125 Even without credit cards, the potential still exists to collect
the data needed to apply a sales tax; such information can be provided through buyers’
shipping addresses. This solution is not without problems, but there is no perfect system
free of difficulties such as rogue consumers who lie about their address. Nonetheless,
once Internet sales taxes are allowed, only creativity will restrict the solutions already
being explored by Apple and other companies.
V. CONCLUSION

¶51

In the United States, accessing the Internet is no less common (AU: I rejected a
change here to “just somewhat,” because I think that undercuts the strength of the
sentence. While the sentence obviously is not 100% accurate, I feel an average reader
would be able to recognize the distinction.) than driving to work; millions of people
engage in the activity on a daily basis.126 Unsurprisingly, then, legal control of the
Internet’s boundaries often raises fears that innovation will be stifled. Sometimes these
worries have merit. The idea that greater regulation of the Internet could stifle its
development is legitimate. Often, however, these worries are based on irrational
suspicions and assumptions.
¶52
States lose revenue each day that Internet sales receive tax-immunity. While
several online retailers have voluntarily begun collecting state sales tax, neither Congress
nor the courts can rely on such methods. “However attractive the notion of a voluntary
system of taxation, the idea invariably falls short when it comes to actually separating
123
124

Kashi, supra note 116, at 129.
Apple Stores, Sales and Refund Policy, available at
www.store.apple.com/Catalog/US/Images/salespolicies.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2004). Such a solution
also answers the conundrum of how to tax a consumer with a billing address and a shipping address that are
not identical.
125
Id.
126
Fallaw, supra note 41 at 162 (“An estimated 66 million Internet users were located in the United
States alone in 1998.”). See also Camilli, supra note 11 at 153 (“Internet use has grown from about 5
million users in 1993 to 62 million in 1997, and it is expected to reach 550 million by the year 2000.”).
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individuals from their wealth.”127 While the Supreme Court has passed the buck on the
issue, Congress has turned a blind eye. Still, the promise of such a system rests in the
hands of the Legislators. The arguments for implementation are sound. The Internet
continues to grow, sales continue to increase, and consequently Congress must
implement the solution now or risk repairing havoc later.
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GUERIN & POSTLEWAITE, supra note 115, at 1.
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